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What moral concerns are relevant when judging the use of cognitive-enhancing (CE)
drugs by healthy people? University students evaluated competitive fairness, distributive
fairness, peer pressure, naturalness, and dosage form. Participants condemned CE drug
use when there were long-term negative effects on health and when CE drug use was seen
to provide an unfair advantage in an exam situation to someone while others were not
taking the drugs. Further, participants judged CE drug use more harshly if the drugs were
artiﬁcial rather than natural and if they were in the form of an injection rather than a pill,
suggesting that moral intuitions relating to purity also inﬂuence opinions on CE drugs.
Cognitive-enhancing (CE) drugs were originally
developed to treat cognitive disabilities such as
narcolepsy, Alzheimer’s disease, or attention deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (Husain & Mehta, 2011; Maher,
2008). Increasingly, however, healthy individuals use
CE drugs such as modaﬁnil (e.g., Provigil1) and methyl-
phenidate (e.g., Ritalin1) to improve cognitive functions
including attention and working memory (Husain &
Mehta, 2011; Maher, 2008; Sahakian & Morein-Zamir,
2007). For example, in a study of 119 U.S. colleges, up
to 25% of healthy students reported CE drug use
(McCabe, Knight, Teter, & Wechsler, 2005). Survey
results (Maher, 2008; Sahakian & Morein-Zamir,
2007), as well as debates in the relevant literature (e.g.,
Greely et al., 2008; Harris & Chatterjee, 2009; Mehlman,
2004), show that views on CE drugs1 are highly polar-
ized, with some noting the potential beneﬁts of enhanc-
ing cognitive ability to both individuals and society,
whereas others warning of the dangers. The present
research aimed to explore the factors underlying
judgments about healthy individuals’ use of CE drugs.
Discussions relating to neuroethics, and in parallel to
doping in competitive sports, have identiﬁed several
factors playing a role in people’s judgments about the
acceptability of chemically enhancing people’s natural
abilities. A key consideration is health, because little is
known about possible negative side effects of CE drugs,
especially in the long term (Chatterjee, 2004, 2006;
Harris & Chatterjee, 2009; Maher, 2008; Sahakian &
Morein-Zamir, 2007). Second, distributive fairness
describes the concern that people with resources have
an unfair competitive advantage over those without
(Cakic, 2009; Greely et al., 2008; Maher, 2008; Sahakian
& Morein-Zamir, 2007). Third, competitive fairness
relates to normative beliefs about the appropriateness
of having to take the drugs in order to remain competitive
(Greely et al., 2008; Maher, 2008; Petro´czi & Aidman,
2008, 2009; Wiefferink, Detmar, Coumans, Vogels, &
Paulussen, 2008). Fourth, discussions of biotechnological
advances have questioned the naturalness of new technol-
ogies, namely, whether they are derived from artiﬁcial or
‘‘natural’’ sources (Kass, 2003; Sagoff, 2001; Watts,
2000). Fifth, related to naturalness is dosage form
(Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2007), that is, the manner
in which drugs are administered (e.g., pill or injection).
Although some of these concerns (e.g., health), are
highly appropriate, other concerns (e.g., naturalness or
dosage form) are more difﬁcult to explain. Such seem-
ingly ‘‘irrational’’ considerations, however, are in line
with recent moral psychological theory. Moving away
from rationalist approaches (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel,
1983), moral psychologists have started to emphasize
the contribution of emotions and other nonrational
1For the remainder of this article, ‘‘CE drugs’’ and ‘‘CE drug use’’
refer to CE drug use by healthy individuals.
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processes to moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). In his social
intuitionist model, Haidt argues that people often make
quick, automatic moral judgments, even if they cannot
provide a valid reason for why something is wrong.
Thus, such judgments are based primarily on moral
intuitions and involve affective evaluations of situations
and events (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjo¨rklund, 2008).
Similarly, Maio and Olson (1998) suggested in their
values-as-truisms hypothesis that people’s values often
lack cognitive support and instead are primarily guided
by emotion.
We believe that, on some level, people consider CE
drugs a moral issue that elicits emotional responses.
Thus, people might not only care about objectively
problematic aspects of CE drugs but also consider issues
that have no rational basis. In other words, some con-
cerns related to CE drugs are justiﬁed, but others might
follow intuitions, and in that sense be akin to ‘‘moral
dumbfounding’’ effects (Haidt, 2001), for which people
simply state that a behavior is wrong in the absence of
any supporting evidence.
In particular, concerns about the naturalness of CE
drugs may follow a moral intuition rather than defens-
ible reasons. A widespread belief is that natural products
are healthier than artiﬁcial ones (Britten, 1994; Britten,
Ukoumunne, & Boulton, 2002; Giveon, 2004; Nufﬁeld
Council on Bioethics, 1999; Sagoff, 2001; Verhoog,
Matze, van Bueren, & Baars, 2003). For example,
Giveon (2004) found that more than half of respondents
believed that ‘‘natural’’ drugs have no negative side-
effects ‘‘because they are natural’’ (p. 10). The concern
for naturalness may relate to people’s desire to keep
the body pure and clean. Feelings of disgust serve an
adaptive function in this context, because they protect
the body from potential contamination, and people
often report disgust at violations of the sanctity of the
human body (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008).
Disgust, however, is not just a response to offensive
objects but also to offensive behaviors, namely, moral
transgressions (Rozin et al., 1999, 2008), and physical
and moral disgust can become conﬂated. For example,
inductions of physical disgust make people’s moral
judgments more severe (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz,
2011; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer,
2012), whereas inductions of physical purity make moral
judgments less severe (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey,
2008).
Similarly, nonrational intuitions may be behind con-
cerns about how CE drugs are administered, because
perceived efﬁcacy and overall preferences differ across
dosage forms (Vallance, 2006). For instance, drug
attributes such as color (de Craen, Roos, de Vries, &
Kleijnen, 1996) or whether drugs are tablets or capsules
(Hussain, 1972) inﬂuence people’s perception of drug
efﬁcacy. Further, a drug’s route of administration2
matters: Although patients prefer orally administered
drugs over injections (Atkinson et al., 2004; Fallowﬁeld
et al., 2006), the latter are perceived as more effective.
Such effects might be due to the fact that injections,
although invasive and unpleasant, might be seen as a
more signiﬁcant treatment compared to other
dosage forms; related concerns might play a role
when people consider the extent to which it is
acceptable to chemically alter healthy people’s natural
abilities.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Discussions of CE drug use have been largely theoreti-
cal, and limited to academic circles, but it is unknown
what the general public thinks of such drugs, and in
particular people for whom they may be highly salient.
We conducted two studies to determine whether moral
concerns about CE drugs reﬂect opinions in the scientiﬁc
literature. Further, we were interested in people’s ‘‘gut
feelings’’ about CE drugs, based on the social intuition-
ist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). We surveyed
students at a very competitive British university, where
CE drug use is a highly relevant topic.
The ﬁrst study explored whether health, distributive
and competitive fairness, naturalness, and dosage form
are concerns when making judgments about the use of
CE drugs by healthy people. Extremity of the moral
transgression was varied with respect to speciﬁc moral
concerns, and we expected that if a given concern was
relevant, moral judgments would vary accordingly.
More speciﬁcally, we expected participants to judge
the use of CE drugs as more wrong if involving negative
side effects on health, if they created distributive and
competitive unfairness, if originating from an unnatural
source, and for invasive dosage forms.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Fifty-one students (44 undergraduates; seven gradu-
ates) from the University of Cambridge (25 female;
M age¼ 20.56 years, SD¼ 2.26) participated. One part-
icipant’s data were excluded due to failure to follow
instructions.
2We use the term ‘‘dosage form’’ to refer to both dosage form and
route of administration.
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Procedure
Students were approached on campus and asked to
complete a brief survey.
Materials
Following a brief deﬁnition of cognitive-enhancing
drugs, participants received questions in the following
format: ‘‘What do you think of healthy people using
cognitive-enhancing drugs to increase mental perfor-
mance if [insert moral concern]?’’ Participants gave their
answers on a 10-point scale (adopted from Schnall et al.,
2008), labeled from 0 (perfectly OK) to 3 (somewhat
wrong) to 6 (very wrong) to 9 (extremely wrong). Parti-
cipants ﬁrst made a global judgment of CE drug use that
consisted only of the baseline question. Then, for each
of the ﬁve moral concerns, three questions varied the
extremity of the situation. Each participant answered
all 16 questions.
Health: No negative side effects on health; temporary
negative side effects on health; long-term negative
side effects on health.
Distributive Fairness: Most people could afford to
buy the drugs; only some people could afford to
buy the drugs; only very few people could afford
to buy the drugs.
Competitive Fairness: The question speciﬁed a healthy
person on a university course taking CE drugs to
enhance exam performance, although the situation
varied: most of the other people in that course were
taking the drugs, some of the other people in that
course were taking the drugs, or none of the other
people in that course were taking the drugs.
Dosage Form: Drug as additive to tea or coffee; drug
as pill; drug as injection.
Naturalness: Drugs sold by organic whole foods
store; drugs sold by supermarket; drugs sold in
pharmacies.
Results
On the global item, participants judged the use of CE
drugs to be between ‘‘somewhat’’ and ‘‘very’’ wrong
(M¼ 4.54, SD¼ 2.67), suggesting a generally negative
view toward CE drug use. We then analyzed each of
the ﬁve concerns with repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs), with extremity as repeated factor
(see Table 1 for means). Bonferroni post hoc tests
followed up on signiﬁcant main effects.
Health
Judgments involving health consequences varied
depending on extremity, F(2, 98)¼ 52.20, p< .001,
gp
2¼ .52. There was a linear trend, F(1, 49)¼ 62.27,
p< .001, gp
2¼ .56, with CE drug use considered most
wrong if involving long-term negative side effects,
less wrong with temporary negative side effects, and
least wrong with no negative side effects. Of interest,
however, the mean for the latter item indicated that even
in the absence of any negative health effects, CE drug
use was judged somewhat wrong rather than being
perfectly acceptable.
Distributive Fairness
Judgments involving distributive fairness differed as a
function of extremity, F(2, 98)¼ 47.17, p< .001,
gp
2¼ .49. CE drug use was rated most wrong if very
few people could afford them, less wrong if some people
could afford them, and least wrong if most people could
afford them, illustrated by a linear trend, F(1,
49)¼ 54.50, p< .001, gp2¼ .53.
Competitive Fairness
Judgments for the competitive fairness of CE drugs
were inﬂuenced by extremity, F(2, 98)¼ 26.66, p< .001,
TABLE 1
Mean Moral Judgments for CE Drug Use Concerns, Study 1
M SD M SD
Health No negative side-effects 4.00a 3.02 Dosage form Additive to tea or coffee 4.72a 2.84
Temporary negative side-effects 5.44b 2.53 Pill 4.78a 2.92
Long-term negative side-effects 7.30a,b 2.29 Injection 5.56b 2.68
Distributive fairness Most people could afford 4.26a 2.85 Naturalness Organic whole foods store 4.80a 2.95
Some people could afford 5.90b 2.47 Supermarket 4.56a 2.92
Only very few people could afford 6.52a,b 2.25 Pharmacies 4.50a 2.87
Competitive fairness No others were taking in exam 7.18a 2.25 Overall moral judgment 4.54 2.67
Some others were taking in exam 6.56b 2.58
Most others were taking in exam 5.46a,b 2.71
Note. N¼ 50 for each item. Scores ranged from 0 to 9, with the following intermittent labels: 0 (perfectly OK), 3 (somewhat wrong), 6 (very wrong),
and 9 (extremely wrong). Means with differing subscripts within the three items related to each concern differ signiﬁcantly at the p< .05 level, using
pairwise Bonferroni comparisons.
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gp
2¼ .35. A linear trend indicated that the use of CE
drugs for an exam was considered most wrong if no other
people were taking them, less wrong if some other people
were taking them, and least wrong if most other people
were taking them, F(1, 49)¼ 34.83, p< .001, gp2¼ .42.
Dosage Form
Participants also cared about the dosage form
through which CE drugs are administered, F(2,
98)¼ 19.43, p< .001, gp2¼ .28. Follow-up comparisons
showed that although there was no signiﬁcant difference
between judgments of CE drugs when added to tea or
coffee compared to a pill, injections were rated more
negatively than those two dosage forms (ps< .001).
Naturalness
Source of the drugs, whether natural or not, did not
matter, F(2, 98)¼ 2.15, p¼ .12, gp2¼ .04.
Discussion
People overall disapproved of CE drug use, as shown by
the results of the global judgment item. This was also
reﬂected in the answers to the more speciﬁc moral
scenarios: Average moral judgments never came close
to indicating CE drug use to be ‘‘perfectly OK.’’
Study 1 conﬁrmed that students at a highly competi-
tive university are concerned with the health, distribu-
tive fairness, and competitive fairness moral aspects of
CE drug use. For the health concern, the least severe
moral judgments were made for the scenario with no
negative side effects on health, more severe for tempor-
ary side effects, and most severe for long-term negative
side effects of CE drugs. This last item showed the high-
est mean condemnation across all items in the survey.
Further, the fewer people could afford CE drugs (i.e.,
increasing distributive unfairness), the more wrong CE
drug use was judged to be. Participants also met
increased competitive unfairness with increasing
condemnation: CE drug use was rated to be more wrong
if there were fewer other people in an exam situation
taking the drugs than in a situation where most others
were taking the drugs.
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, which
can be considered serious factors that require careful
rational analyses, we also found that seemingly irrel-
evant considerations play a role when assessing the
acceptability of CE drug use: Injections were judged to
be more wrong than pills, or additives to drinks, in line
with earlier ﬁndings that injections are perceived as
more powerful treatments (Atkinson et al., 2004;
Fallowﬁeld et al., 2006).
Unexpectedly, drug source did not matter: CE drugs
from organic whole foods stores, supermarkets, or phar-
macies were given equal moral ratings. Perhaps place of
purchase did not reveal much about the drugs’ makeup,
that is, did not create clear artiﬁcial versus natural
distinctions. The operationalization for naturalness
was therefore not ideal, and this and other questions
were examined further in a follow-up study.
STUDY 2
A second study aimed to replicate the ﬁndings from
Study 1 regarding people’s concerns about health,
competitive fairness, and distributive fairness and to
elaborate on the effects of naturalness and dosage form.
In addition, we differentiated between the concepts of
competitive fairness and peer pressure, which in the ﬁrst
study were treated as a single construct. Competitive
fairness relates to professional or academic goal attain-
ment, whereas peer pressure results from people’s need
to belong to a social group and causes them to conform
to the explicit and implicit social norms of that group
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The concern regarding
CE drugs might therefore involve the fear that if many
people in one’s social circle were taking the drugs, one
would also have to take them to ﬁt in.
As in Study 1, we expected that CE drug use would be
judged as more wrong with negative side effects on
health and if taking them resulted in competitive or
distributive unfairness. We also explored whether com-
petitive fairness and peer pressure would interact such
that it would matter whether the other people taking
the drugs (or not) were friends or competitors. Such
an interaction would reveal the relative importance of
competitive fairness and peer pressure for our popu-
lation. Further, the measure of naturalness was altered
to reﬂect more directly the difference between artiﬁcial
and natural CE drugs. We further tested for an interac-
tion between dosage form and naturalness, because both
factors relate to the physical nature of the drug itself.
Thus, with the addition of peer pressure, we examined
six distinct moral concerns related to CE drug use:
health, competitive fairness, distributive fairness, peer
pressure, naturalness, and dosage form.
We also addressed another limitation of Study 1: It
may have produced carryover effects because parti-
cipants received all three variations of a question.
Instead, Study 2 used a between-subjects design, and
each participant received only one of 12 possible ques-
tions. Another possible confound was that the 10-point
scale had featured the word ‘‘wrong’’ three times, which
possibly caused a negative priming effect. The scale was
therefore shortened and had no intermittent labels.
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Method
Participants
Three hundred six students (245 undergraduates, 39
graduates, one ‘‘other’’) from the University of Cambridge
(157 female;M age¼ 20.74 years, SD¼ 2.26) participated.
Procedure
Students were approached on campus and asked to
complete a brief survey.
Materials
The baseline question was, ‘‘What do you think of
healthy people using cognitive-enhancing drugs in order
to increase their mental performance if the drugs were
[insert moral concern]?’’ For each of the six concerns,
two variations of the baseline question manipulated
extremity, resulting in 12 different conditions. Parti-
cipants responded to questions using a 6-point scale,
labeled 0 (perfectly OK) to 5 (extremely wrong).
Health; distributive fairness. The two most extreme
items of Study 1 were retained.
Competitive fairness and peer pressure. We
combined the items for competitive fairness and peer
pressure, allowing testing for an interaction effect
between the variables. The conditions varied whether
other people took the drugs or not, and whether these
were friends or competitors in an exam situation. Four
items resulted, of which each participant answered only
one: ‘‘What do you think of a healthy university student
taking cognitive-enhancing drugs to enhance their exam
performance if none of the other students in that course
were taking the drugs?’’ ‘‘What do you think of a
healthy university student taking cognitive-enhancing
drugs to enhance their exam performance if all of the
other students in that course were taking the drugs?’’
‘‘What do you think of a healthy person using
cognitive-enhancing drugs in order to increase their
mental performance if all of their friends were taking
the drugs?’’ and ‘‘What do you think of a healthy person
using cognitive-enhancing drugs in order to increase
their mental performance if none of their friends were
taking the drugs?’’
Naturalness and dosage form. For naturalness we
distinguished between herbal and artiﬁcial, crossed with
dosage form of drink additive and injection. Items were
as follows: Drug is herbal extract administered using
injection; drug is herbal extract contained in drink; drug
is created artiﬁcially and administered using injection;
drugs is created artiﬁcially and contained in drink.
Results
Health
As expected, participants rated the use of CE drugs as
signiﬁcantly more wrong when involving long-term
negative side effects, rather than no negative side effects,
t(50)¼ 2.56, p< .007, r¼ .34 (see Table 2 for means).
Distributive Fairness
Unexpectedly, ratings did not differ between only few
people, or most people being able to afford them,
t(50)¼ 0.87, p< .20, r¼ .12.
Competitive Fairness and Peer Pressure
A two-way ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant main
effects of either peer pressure, F(1, 100)¼ 2.54, p¼ .11,
gp
2¼ .03, or competitive fairness, F(1, 100)¼ 0.04,
p¼ .85, gp2¼ .00 (see Figure 1 for means). However,
there was an interaction effect, F(1, 100)¼ 4.97,
p¼ .03, gp2¼ .05. A post hoc Bonferroni test showed
that participants considered it more wrong for a person
to take CE drugs when no other competitors were taking
the drugs, compared to no other friends (p< .05).
Naturalness and Dosage Form
Signiﬁcant main effects for both naturalness and dos-
age form emerged, as shown by a two-way independent
ANOVA (see Figure 2 for means). CE drug use was con-
sidered more wrong if drugs were artiﬁcial rather than
herbal, F(1, 94)¼ 7.75, p¼ .006, gp2¼ .08, and if they
were in the form of an injection rather than a drink,
F(1, 94)¼ 4.93, p¼ .03, gp2¼ .05. The two variables
did not interact, F(1, 94)¼ 0.79, p¼ .38, gp2¼ .01, sug-
gesting that judgment of dosage form did not depend
on the type of drug.
TABLE 2
Mean Moral Judgments for CE Drug Use Concerns, Study 2
N M SD
Health No negative side effects 26 2.73a 1.69
Long-term negative side effects 26 3.81b 1.33
Distributive
fairness
Only very few people could afford 26 3.58a 1.50
Most people could afford 26 3.19a 1.70
Note. Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following endpoint labels: 0
(perfectly OK) and 5 (extremely wrong). Means with differing sub-
scripts differed signiﬁcantly at the p< .05 level.
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Discussion
Consistent with the results from Study 1, concerns for
health were again found to matter to participants, with
the highest condemnation for assumed long-term health
risks. This supports our expectation that health is an
important factor in people’s moral judgments of CE
drug use (see also Maher, 2008). Of interest, however,
distributive fairness did not matter, contrary to the
results of Study 1. One possible reason for this is that
the format of Study 1 might have led participants to give
socially desirable responses and indicate greater con-
cerns for justice when explicitly contrasting people
who can afford certain drugs with people who cannot.
In contrast, Study 2 did not allow such a comparison
because each participant only received one format of
the question.
The results of combining competitive fairness and
peer pressure suggested that if no others were using
CE drugs in a given context, it was considered more
wrong if the individual using them did so in a competi-
tive situation compared to in a context with friends.
Thus, university students in our sample were especially
concerned about the unfair advantage a drug might con-
fer to an individual in an exam situation where other
students do not use such drugs, which is in line with sug-
gestions in the literature (e.g., Cakic, 2009).
Further, as expected, dosage form and naturalness
were both relevant: Participants considered CE drug
use to be more wrong if the drugs were artiﬁcial rather
than herbal (see also Britten, 1994; Britten et al., 2002;
Giveon, 2004). Dosage form was also found to be
relevant, with the more invasive form, an injection, con-
demned more strongly than the less invasive form (see
also Atkinson et al., 2004; Fallowﬁeld et al., 2006).
Findings from these latter two concerns suggest that in
addition to objectively valid concerns, condemnation
of CE drugs also involves moral intuitions (Haidt,
2001) that are more difﬁcult to justify on completely
rational grounds.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Findings from two studies demonstrated that a number
of factors matter to university students’ opinion on the
use of CE drugs. Across all the factors we tested, it is
noteworthy that even when aggregate responses were
near the middle of our moral judgment scales, they
always leaned toward the negative, and people never
came close to judging CE drug use as being ‘‘perfectly
OK.’’ But not all factors mattered equally; among the
most important concerns were dangers to health, and
the competitive advantage provided to an individual
using the drugs in examination situations in which other
people do not use them. Given that our participants
were students at a highly competitive university, it
comes as no surprise that the thought of some students
performing better due to CE drugs would be highly dis-
concerting. These ﬁndings are consistent with the issues
raised in the scientiﬁc discussions of CE drug use (e.g.,
Cakic, 2009; Greely et al., 2008).
In contrast to the scientiﬁc discourse, however,
distributive fairness—in other words, equal access to
the drugs—was less of a concern to participants in our
sample. Students considered unequal access problematic
only when this issue was made very salient in the survey,
in which case their responses might have reﬂected a
hesitation to openly endorse unfair access. Further, the
relative lack of concern for distributive fairness might
be due to the fact that many participants in our
sample may have come from a privileged
socioeconomic background for which access issues
appear less relevant.
FIGURE 2 Mean moral judgments of naturalness and dosage form,
Study 2. Note. Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following endpoint
labels: 0 (perfectly OK) to 5 (extremely wrong).
FIGURE 1 Mean moral judgments of competitive fairness and peer
pressure, Study 2. Note. Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following
endpoint labels: 0 (perfectly OK) and 5 (extremely wrong).
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Somewhat surprisingly, given the discussion in the
literature (Maher, 2008), peer pressure was not found
to be a central relevant moral concern to our parti-
cipants. We should caution that our sample sizes were
limited, so with greater samples we might have obtained
a statistically signiﬁcant effect. Nevertheless, when
examining effect sizes, the magnitude of effect was
comparatively small for peer pressure, relative to other
concerns, such as health.
As noted earlier, we believe that judgments about CE
drugs are on a fundamental level moral judgments and,
as such, can be inﬂuenced by valid, rational considera-
tions, but also by rather emotional, and possibly
irrational, considerations (Haidt, 2001). For example,
although it is difﬁcult to provide a rational argument
for why it should matter whether CE drugs were derived
from a natural or synthetic source, it did matter to our
participants: In Study 2, participants rated the use of
herbal CE drugs as less wrong than the use of artiﬁcial
CE drugs. This is consistent with research showing that
people believe that natural drugs have fewer negative
side effects than artiﬁcial drugs (Britten, 1994; Britten
et al., 2002; Giveon, 2004). Although concerns of
naturalness are difﬁcult to explain based on objective
evidence, they might reﬂect people’s propensity to guard
the purity of the body (Rozin et al., 2008; Schnall et al.,
2008), and artiﬁcial substances appear to be perceived as
more dangerous contaminants than natural substances.
Indeed, so many people consume large amounts of cof-
fee on a daily basis, presumably at least in part to
become more cognitively alert, that coffee is the second
most commonly traded commodity in the world, sur-
passed only by crude oil (Trade Commodities, 2011).
Thus, mild cognitive enhancement derived from plant
sources is very much part of daily life but is usually
not met with strong moral objection.
Along similar lines, both studies made clear that
dosage form is a relevant moral concern. Participants
regarded the administration of CE drugs via an injection
to be more wrong than via a drink, in line with research
on patient preferences for certain dosage forms
(Atkinson et al., 2004; Fallowﬁeld et al., 2006). One
possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that injections,
as opposed to dosage forms such as pills, may invoke
disgust because they involve penetration of the body’s
protective envelope, which is a violation of the purity
ethic (Rozin et al., 2008).
Overall, the current ﬁndings point to the role of
moral intuitions when deciding about the ethics of
real-life dilemmas. They contribute to the ongoing
debate about the place of CE drugs in society by com-
paring between academic discussion and moral attitudes
in a student population—a segment of the population
with much to gain or lose with changes in CE drug
use policy. Some cognitive neuroscientists argue that
‘‘mentally competent adults should be able to engage
in cognitive enhancement using drugs’’ (Greely et al.,
2008, p. 703), assuming the development of safe drugs,
and appropriate laws to ensure fairness and minimize
coercion. Indeed, we found that in our participants,
health was a primary concern, and hence it is possible
that the legalization of CE drugs with negligible side
effects could be met with few ethical objections.
However, we also found that several other concerns
contributed in important ways to participants’ condem-
nation of CE drugs. Although some factors, such as
naturalness or dosage form, might be considered objec-
tively less relevant, the fact that they do matter to people
warrants closer examination. Our ﬁndings illuminate the
complexity of concerns—whether based on rational
considerations, or on gut feelings and intuitions—that
may need to be taken into account in public policy deci-
sions regulating the use of CE drugs. Thus, our ﬁndings,
together with the existing discussions in the media and
in academic circles, suggest that the question of whether
society should endorse or prohibit the development and
use of drug-based methods of cognitive enhancement is
a moral one, and is likely to continue to stir emotion,
and controversy.
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